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This paper analyzes the disclosure strategy of ﬁrms that face uncertainty regarding the
investor’s response to a voluntary disclosure of the ﬁrm’s private information. This paper
distinguishes itself from the existing disclosure literature in that ﬁrms do not use voluntary
disclosures to separate themselves from the less proﬁtable ﬁrms. Here, voluntary disclo-
sures are used to redistribute risk. It is shown that in a partial disclosure equilibrium, a
ﬁrm discloses relatively bad news and withholds relatively good news. The reason for
nondisclosure is that a ﬁrm is not willing to risk a negative response by the investor. How-
ever, if private information is relatively bad, nondisclosure imposes such a high risk on
the investor, that he invests most of his capital in investment opportunities other than the
ﬁrm. In that case, the ﬁrm is better off by disclosing its private information as this reduces
the risk of the investor and increases the expected investment in the ﬁrm.
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11 Introduction
Information asymmetries between ﬁrms and investors hamper the allocation of capital across
the most productive investment opportunities. Conditional on disclosure being truthful and
costless, Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) show that in equilibrium, ﬁrms resolve these
information asymmetries by fully disclosing their private information. This result is in strong
contrast with empirical observations of ﬁrms not engaging in such full disclosure behavior
and has lead subsequent research to ﬁnding theoretical explanations for nondisclosure. To this
purpose, Verrecchia (1983), Dye (1986), Wagenhofer (1990), and Feltham and Xie (1992),
amongst others, introduce (non)proprietary costs of disclosure, while Dye (1985) introduces
uncertainty about the existence of private information. In this paper, the incentive to nondis-
close arises because ﬁrms have imperfect information regarding investors’ expectations. Due
to this information asymmetry, disclosure brings about a certain amount of risk as ﬁrms do not
perfectly know ex ante, how investors will respond to a disclosure. In this respect, the paper is
similar to Kanodia and Lee (1998), where disclosure also puts a certain amount of risk on the
disclosing ﬁrm. In Kanodia and Lee (1998), however, this risk serves as a cost to improve the
quality of the disclosed signal, meaning that disclosure plays a similar role as retained equity
does in Leland and Pyle (1977). Then, in equilibrium, ﬁrms with better private information
make higher quality disclosures. This paper distinguishes itself from the existing literature
in that ﬁrms do not use voluntary disclosures to separate themselves from ﬁrms with worse
private information. Here, voluntary disclosures serve to redistribute the risk that ﬁrms and
investors bear as a result of the existing information asymmetry.
The model considers a single investor and two ﬁrms. The investor has a limited amount
of capital available that he can invest in any of the two ﬁrms or in some outside investment
project with known return. A ﬁrm’s return can either be high or low and is private information
of the ﬁrm. To model the uncertainty regarding the investor’s response, I assume that a ﬁrm
knows the absolute value of its return, but not whether this return is the high or the low return.
Since the investor wants to invest in the most proﬁtable investment opportunity, disclosing that
one is a low type yields a negative response, as the investor prefers investing in the other ﬁrm
to investingin the disclosing ﬁrm. Similarly, disclosing that one is a high type yields a positive
response, as the investor prefers investing in the disclosing ﬁrm to investing in the other ﬁrm.
As a result, a ﬁrm is willing to disclose its return only if, conditional on its private information,
it assigns a high probability to being the most proﬁtable ﬁrm, i.e. having the high return.
The main results of the paper are the following. First, a full disclosure equilibrium
always exists and is supported by skeptical beliefs of the investor. Second, a full nondisclosure
2equilibriumexistsiftheﬁrms’posteriorbeliefsofbeingthemostproﬁtableﬁrmaresufﬁciently
low. In thatcase, ﬁrmsprefer nondisclosurebecausethe riskof gettinganunfavorable response
by the investor is too high. Third, a partial disclosure equilibrium may exist in which ﬁrms
disclose low returns and withhold high returns. The explanation for this is the following. Let
the cost of disclosure be the change in the ﬁrm’s risk between nondisclosure and disclosure,
and let the beneﬁt of disclosure be the respective change in expected investment in the ﬁrm.
Then the incentivetodisclose relativelylowproﬁts arisesbecause nondisclosurewouldimpose
too much risk on the investor, so that risk diversiﬁcation arguments induce the investor to
invest part of his capital in the outside option. Since this implies that the ﬁrm’s expected
investment under nondisclosure is relatively low, the beneﬁt of disclosure is relatively high. In
addition, nondisclosure imposes risk on the ﬁrm; because the ﬁrm has imperfect knowledge
about the investor’s expectations, it does not know how much the investor will invest in the
outside option and how much he will invest in the ﬁrm. This uncertainty makes the cost of
disclosure relatively low. Conversely, if proﬁts are relatively high, nondisclosure imposes only
little risk on the investor so that no investments in the outside option are made. Since in
that case the ﬁrm’s expected investment under nondisclosure is relatively high, the beneﬁt of
disclosure is relatively low. Furthermore, since zero investment in the outside option implies
that nondisclosure imposes no risk on the ﬁrm, the cost of disclosure is relatively high.
In a partial disclosure equilibrium, voluntary disclosures are used to redistribute the risk
that arises from the information asymmetry between the investor and the ﬁrms. Nondisclosure
allocates most of the risk to the investor, while disclosure transfers (part of) this risk to the
ﬁrms. The results imply that one should observe more voluntary disclosures in industries with
higher risk. Since investors are unfavorably disposed towards investing in risky industries,
ﬁrms need to use voluntary disclosures to reduce the risk of the investors, for otherwise they
will invest their capital in other industries. In low risk industries, on the other hand, ﬁrms are
aware that investors will invest in their industry anyway. Hence, nondisclosure should occur
more frequently as ﬁrms are not willing to risk a negative response by the investors.
In a partial disclosure equilibrium, the equilibrium allocation of risk need not be socially
efﬁcient. It is shown that Pareto improvements can be obtained by allowing for transfer pay-
ments. For instance, in a nondisclosure equilibrium, all three parties may be better off if the
investorcompensatestheﬁrms for disclosingtheir information. Disclosurealsoneed notbe the
socially efﬁcient outcome. Only if the risk borne by the investor is relatively large compared
to the risk borne by the ﬁrms, is disclosure socially efﬁcient and are mandatory disclosure
regulations desirable.
3The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 providesa formal descrip-
tion of the model. Section 3 presents the equilibrium results and discusses the multiplicity of
equilibria and the efﬁciency of risk sharing. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5
concludes. All proofs have been relegated to the appendix.
2 The model
The model consists of three decision makers, two ﬁrms (i.e. their managers) and a single











i denotes the pri-








  denotes the private information of the investor.
￿
i
represents the return of a constant return to scales investment project of ﬁrm
i and is net of
the manager’s compensation payments.
  represents the investor’s expectations regarding the
industry that the two ﬁrms operate in. Let
v denote some publicly unobservable industry char-
acteristic that determines the return of each ﬁrm and the beliefs of the investor. The value of
v
is randomly distributed according to the density function
f with support
V . The domain
V is
unbounded from above by assumption. A ﬁrm’s investment project can be one of two types, a






















0 is common knowledge. Notice that since the ﬁrm’s managers do not know the value of
v, they do not know whether they are a high type or a low type. For mathematical convenience,
I assume for the investor’s beliefs that
 
=
v.1 So, conditional on








































































To undertake the project, each ﬁrm needs to acquire capital from the investor. The
investor has an endowment of capital
c
>
0 and, without loss of generality, I assume that
c
=
1. The investor can invest this capital in any of the two ﬁrms, or he can invest in some
outside option generating a return on investment
￿
0.2 By investing in ﬁrm
i, the investor
1This assumption has no signiﬁcant effect on the main results of this paper. Modeling
  as a noisy signal of
v only increases the number of possible states of the world without any signiﬁcant effect on the structure of the
ﬁrms’ and investor’s decision problems. In either way of modeling,the investor’s beliefs concerninga ﬁrm’s type
differ from the ﬁrm’s beliefs of what the investor believes. It is this difference that drives the results.
2One can think of the outside option as investing in the risk free asset. To avoid confusion, however,I will not
refer to
￿
0 as being the risk free asset, since the ﬁrms’ investmentprojects are modeled as risk free investmentsas
well. In this model, risk only arises from information asymmetry. This simple structure reduces the complexity
of the analysis without signiﬁcantly affecting the results.
4receives the ﬁrm’s ownership rights so that each dollar invested earns the investor the return
￿










0. Prior to the investor’s
investmentdecision, each ﬁrm can voluntarilydisclose the return
￿
i of its investmentproject to
the investor. I assume that all disclosures are truthful and that the disclosure decision is made
simultaneously by both ﬁrms. The investor is not able to credibly disclose any information on
  to the ﬁrms.3
The investor’s objective is to maximize the expected utility from the investments’ re-
turns. The utility function is denoted by
U












each project features constant returns to scale, the size of each project and the size of each
managers’ compensation are determined by the amount of capital that each manager acquires.
Managers are assumed to be risk averse and maximize the expected utility of their compensa-







g, the utility function of
ﬁrm
i’s manager is denoted by
U




















The equilibrium concept that I will use to analyze the disclosure behavior of the ﬁrms is
that of a Bayesian equilibrium. In brief, a Bayesian equilibrium consists of a set of disclo-
sure/investment strategies and beliefs such that the strategies are optimal with respect to the
beliefs and the beliefs are rational with respect to the strategies. A more formal description
follows below.




























































). The beliefs of ﬁrm
i then
specify the probability that ﬁrm
i assigns to the occurence of each state. Notice that ﬁrm
i has






￿. Using Bayes’ rule, the posterior probability
that
￿





























































), that is ﬁrm
i updates its













3Notice that the investor has a strong incentive to understate
 , for revealing a low
  induces more disclosure




































































































































































































This notation allows for a convenient representation of the investor’sprivate information. Prior






























The investment decision of the investor depends on
v, the disclosure decision of the
ﬁrms, and the investor’s posterior beliefs concerning the proﬁtability of a nondisclosing ﬁrm.
The posterior beliefs
￿






















































































































￿ , then the investor knows that a nondisclos-
ing ﬁrm is a high type, for otherwise it would have disclosed its private information. Since




















￿, then ﬁrms always withhold their pri-






















































































































































































































) that describes how
much the investor invests in the outside option, ﬁrm
1, and ﬁrm
2, respectively. Recall that
the investor is constrained by his endowment
c
=
1 and that the investor does not receive
any utility from not investing. Furthermore, since I exclude short selling, feasible investment













































a Bayesian equilibrium if





























































































































































































Condition (a) requires that the disclosure strategy maximizes the ﬁrm’s expected utility given
theotherﬁrm’sdisclosurestrategy,theinvestor’sinvestmentdecisionandtheinvestor’sbeliefs.





(b) requires that the investment decision maximizes the expected utility of the investor given
his beliefs
￿







2. Condition (c) requires that the posterior
beliefs follow Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
An equilibrium is called a full disclosure equilibrium if both ﬁrms always reveal their



















an equilibrium is called a full nondisclosure equilibrium if both ﬁrms always withhold their




















equilibrium is called a partial disclosure equilibrium in all other cases.
Proposition 1 A full disclosure equilibrium always exists.
Afulldisclosureequilibriumissupportedbyskepticalbeliefsoftheinvestor. Thismeans
that if the investor observes nondisclosure by a ﬁrm, he beliefs that this ﬁrm has the low type
investment project. Hence, disclosure (weakly) dominates nondisclosure. Notice that in order
to sustain a full disclosure equilibrium, the investor must be able to commit to skeptical beliefs
ex ante. To see this, suppose that ﬁrm
j discloses its private information and that the investor











0, the investor knows that the disclosing ﬁrm















































































































If, however, the investor cannot commit to skeptical beliefs, the latter investment decision is























investing in the nondisclosing ﬁrm








































0, the investor knows that the disclosing ﬁrm
j is a high type. The
































). In this case, it is does not matter whether the investor
can commit to skeptical beliefs or not; the optimal investment strategy allocates all of the


































So, conditional on ﬁrm
j disclosing its private information, the optimal disclosure deci-
sion of ﬁrm



















































































































































































































































































































































































































Hence, if the investor cannot commit to skeptical beliefs, full disclosure of private information
need not occur.
The structure of the information asymmetry is such that each party has imperfect infor-
mation about the type of the investment projects. Although ﬁrms know the return of their own
4Throughoutthepaperit is assumedthatif the investorhas identicalposteriorinformationaboutbothﬁrms, he

































































g this investment decision is not the unique optimal investment decision.







i only knows the expected return
￿
i of its investment project.
8investment project, they do not know whether their investment project is the high or the low
type project. This lack of information puts a certain amount of risk on the disclosure decision
of the ﬁrms and the investment decision of the investor. In this model, disclosure strategies
can serve as instruments to allocate this risk.
The investor bears most of the risk if both ﬁrms withhold their private information. To
diversify this risk, the investor will invest part of his capital in the outside option. More

















































































0 . Since the ﬁrms are




































) if this ﬁrm turns out to be a low type. To






























































































































































p, and the risk























￿. In that case,
v
￿
v implies that the investor will not invest in the ﬁrms whatever their disclosure decisions.













































































































































































). So, if both ﬁrms withholdtheir privateinformation, the
ﬁrm’suncertaintyregardingtheinvestor’sprivateinformationimplies,thattheﬁrm isuncertain
about the amountof capital thatthe investorwill investin the outsideoptionand the ﬁrms. This





0, the investor does not invest in ﬁrm
i. Notice that such
investment decision arises endogenously if the investor is risk averse, the outside option is risk free, and the







i (cf. footnote 4).

































































































The risk that arises from the uncertainty regarding the ﬁrms’ types is (partly) transfered
from the investor to the ﬁrms if either one or both ﬁrms disclose their private information. Let
mestartwithdiscussingthecase thatonlyoneofthetwoﬁrmsdisclosesitsprivateinformation,
ﬁrm
i say. First, observe that ﬁrm











0. Since the investor learns ﬁrm
i’s type, he no longer bears
the risk associated with ﬁrm
i’s type. This risk is now borne by the disclosing ﬁrm
i and
the nondisclosing ﬁrm









j does not disclose. Then from ﬁrm
i’s perspective,
ﬁrm
















































































) , i.e. the investor will invest more in ﬁrm
i if it
is a high type than if it is a low type. The disclosure of ﬁrm
i also affects the payoff of ﬁrm
j. From ﬁrm
j’s perspective, ﬁrm
i is a high type with probability



















i is a low type with probability
1
￿



















































the investor will invest more in ﬁrm
j if ﬁrm
i is the low type than if ﬁrm

















































). If only ﬁrm
i discloses, then ﬁrm














































j does not disclose, ﬁrm






) of being a high type is sufﬁciently high. One can show that a similar result












converges to one as
￿
i becomes inﬁnitely large. Convergence, namely, induces full disclosure
by the usual unravelling argument. Firms with high returns will disclose their information
as these ﬁrms know almost certainly that they are a high type. Then, conditional on this
behavior, the investor perceives nondisclosure as a bad signal so that the ﬁrms with lower
returns will also disclose their information. Table 1 shows for various classes of probability





) as a function of
￿
i. Observe that convergence




































































































































































































































































) for various classes of probability distributions.
Cauchy distributions because of the relatively fat tails that these distributions exhibit.
Proposition 2 A full nondisclosure equilibrium exists if the ﬁrms’ posterior beliefs of being











































































































the probability for which ﬁrm
i is indifferent between nondisclosure and disclosure given the
equilibrium nondisclosure strategy of ﬁrm










0 yields zero investment in ﬁrm
i, ﬁrm


































































) is lower for low values of
￿
















































2, so that nondisclosure also
imposes some risk on the ﬁrm. This risk arises from the fact that a ﬁrm does not know how
much the investor will invest in the outside option, and thus, how much the investor will invest







￿, the cost of disclosure, i.e. the change











So, to sustain nondisclosure as the optimal disclosure decision, the beneﬁts of disclosure, i.e.
















































3, a full nondisclosure equilibrium
can easily be constructed by appropriately choosing
p and the parameters of the distribution of
v if
v is Gamma, Pareto, or Cauchy distributed (cf. Table 1).





































































































































































































































































































0 and will therefore not invest in this ﬁrm.































). If only one nondisclosure
interval arises in equilibrium, the investor always learns whether a ﬁrm is proﬁtable or not. If












































that case the investor knows that ﬁrms are not proﬁtable, ﬁrm



























￿, a high type ﬁrm also does not disclose. Then if the investor observes






























































































0 implies that the investor can infer that a
nondisclosing ﬁrm is a low type.



















￿ the posterior probability
of being a high type is sufﬁciently high, so that disclosure of
￿




















































￿ , rationality implies that a nondisclosing ﬁrm is a high


















































then nondisclosure also imposes some risk on the ﬁrms. Since this risk reduces the cost of





). In particular, this implies that in a
partial disclosure equilibrium, disclosure can be optimal even for ﬁrms that expect to be of a

















































￿ , so that nondisclosure is optimal for ﬁrm
i. From Proposition 2 it follows











































































































































￿, the investor knows that a nondisclosing
ﬁrm isa high type. Hence, ﬁrm







￿ , so that ﬁrm
i is a low type. Since disclosing that one is a low
type yields no beneﬁts, nondisclosure is the optimal decision for ﬁrm
i.
13The partial disclosure equilibria characterized by Proposition 3, have the common fea-
ture that ﬁrms do not disclose relatively high returns. The following proposition shows that
a reverse partial disclosure strategy in which ﬁrms only disclose high returns cannot not be
supported in equilibrium.




























g, does not exist.
Reason for the nonexistence of such disclosure equilibria is that with such disclosure
strategies, the investor perceives nondisclosure as a bad signal. Hence, upon observing nondis-
closure, the investor believes that the nondisclosing ﬁrm is a low type, so that this ﬁrm is
(weakly) better off by disclosing its private information. As a result, the ﬁrm ends up disclos-
ing the low returns as well and a full disclosure equilibrium emerges.
3.1 Multiplicity of equilibria
The equilibrium analysis shows that various disclosure strategies can be supported in equilib-
rium. Besides the two extreme equilibria of full disclosure and full nondisclosure, multiple
partial disclosure equilibria can exist. In fact, the following example shows that the number of
partial disclosure equilibria can be inﬁnite.






















































￿. Since the investor is

















































































































































































condition (3.c) is satisﬁed.








Figure 1: Partial disclosure equilibrium.
With the existence of multiple disclosure equilibria comes the problem of equilibrium
selection. Since none of the three parties involved can enforce a particular equilibrium, there
is no unambiguous answer to the question which equilibrium will emerge. Obviously, the
investor always prefers the disclosure equilibrium payoffs to the nondisclosure equilibrium
payoffs.6 For the ﬁrms, however, this only holds if the posterior beliefs of being a high type













g prefers the disclosure equilibrium payoffs
































































































) is increasing in
￿
i, disclosure is more likely to be preferred for
low values of
￿
i than for high values. Again, the reason for this is that for low values of
￿
i,
nondisclosure also puts some risk on the ﬁrms. Since this implies that the cost of disclosure is
lower for low values of
￿



































































￿, each ﬁrm prefers
6The disclosure equilibrium payoffs for a particular state of the world are the payoffs that the subjects re-
ceive if, in equilibrium, both ﬁrms disclose their private information in this particular state of the world. The
equilibrium nondisclosure payoffs are deﬁned similarly.


















￿ . Hence, from the ﬁrms’






￿dominates the other partial
disclosure equilibria, the full disclosure equilibrium and the full nondisclosure equilibrium.
3.2 Risk sharing efﬁciency
In a partial disclosure equilibrium, ﬁrms use their disclosure strategies to redistribute the risk
that arises from the information asymmetry between the investor and the ﬁrms. In equilib-
rium, however, efﬁcient risk sharing is not guaranteed. The following example shows that, in
equilibrium, agents can obtain a Pareto improvement by using transfer payments.

































1so that all three parties
are equally risk averse. Let






Notice that since all decision makers are constant absolute risk averse, the value of
v does not



























































￿, both a full disclosure and
a full nondisclosure equilibriumexist. Suppose the full disclosure equilibrium arises. Then the






























































g, ﬁrms prefer the nondisclosure equilibrium payoffs. A



















































































































0. If both ﬁrms would disclose their private information,






6. In this case, a Pareto improvement




3 to reveal their information. Then

























Example 2 shows that all three parties may beneﬁt from a collective agreement in which
either the ﬁrms compensate the investor for concealing their private information, or the in-
vestor compensates the ﬁrms for revealing their private information. Notice that such Pareto
improvementsare not driven by differences in risk aversion. The main reason for the existence
of such Pareto improvements, is the fact that the risk that nondisclosure puts on the investor
differs from the risk that disclosure puts on the ﬁrms. To see this, observe that the dispersion
in the investor’s payoff under nondisclosure is
2




￿and the low proﬁt project
v
￿
￿, while the dispersion of the ﬁrm’s payoff of
disclosure is at most
1, i.e. the ﬁrm receives the maximum investment
1 if it discloses that it
is of a high type and the ﬁrm receives zero investment if it discloses that it is of a low type.
So, if
￿ is relatively small, nondisclosure puts relatively little risk on the investor. Then a
cooperative agreement in which the ﬁrms pay the investor to conceal their information might
be beneﬁcial as the investor requires only a small compensation for the risk that he bears under
nondisclosure. Similarly, if
￿ is relatively high, nondisclosure puts a relatively high risk on
the investor. Then a cooperative agreement in which the investor pays the ﬁrms to disclose
their information may be beneﬁcial as the investor is willing to pay a relatively large amount
of money for the ﬁrms’ private information.
4 Discussion
The primary determinant of a ﬁrm’s disclosure decision is the ﬁrm’s beliefs of having good
information. If the ﬁrm believes it has good information, a voluntary disclosure of this in-
formation is likely to trigger a favorable reaction by the investor. Hence, the more positive a
ﬁrm is about the value of its own information, the more likely it will disclose this information.
These beliefs, however, are sensitive to the distribution of the investor’s private information.
The relationship between the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm’s investment project and his beliefs about
the investor’s valuation of this proﬁtability need not be monotonically increasing. In fact, it is
well possible that higher proﬁts reduce the ﬁrm’s beliefs of having good information. Conse-
quently, ﬁrms may prefer to conceal good information.
A secondary determinant of the ﬁrm’s disclosure decision is the disclosure decision of
the other ﬁrm. This relationship is best explained on the basis of Example 1 and Figure 1.
17Disclosure of information is optimal for ﬁrm
i if its beliefs of having good information, i.e.














), and, given that ﬁrm








































￿ , the disclosure decision of
ﬁrm
i depends on the disclosure decision of ﬁrm
j. If ﬁrm
i believes that ﬁrm
j will disclose
its private information, it is optimal for ﬁrm
i to disclose as well. Conversely, if ﬁrm
i believes
that ﬁrm
j will not disclose, it is optimal for ﬁrm
i to nondisclose as well. Notice, however,












i prefers disclosure to nondisclosure independent of the disclosure decision
of ﬁrm
j.
In this model, the interdependency between the ﬁrm’s disclosure decisions arises from
the fact that ﬁrms compete for the investor’s limited amount of capital. A disclosure by one
ﬁrm does not only affect the payoff of this disclosing ﬁrm, but also the payoff of the other
ﬁrm. Disclosure dynamics within an industry of ﬁrms are more extensively examined in Dye
and Sridhar (1995). There, however, the source of the interdependency is correlation in the
distribution of the ﬁrms’ private information.
In a partial disclosure equilibrium, ﬁrms disclose relatively low proﬁts and conceal rel-
atively high proﬁts. The explanation for this is the following. Let the cost of disclosure be
the change in the ﬁrm’s risk between nondisclosure and disclosure, and let the beneﬁt of dis-
closure be the respective change in expected investment in the ﬁrm. Then the incentive to
disclose relatively low proﬁts arises because nondisclosure would impose too much risk on the
investor, so that risk diversiﬁcation arguments induce the investor to invest part of his capital in
the outside option. Since this implies that the ﬁrm’s expected investment under nondisclosure
is relatively low, the beneﬁt of disclosure is relatively high. In addition, nondisclosure imposes
risk on the ﬁrm. Since the ﬁrm does not have perfect knowledge about the investor’s private
information, it does not know how much the investor will invest in the outside option and how
much he will invest in the ﬁrm. This uncertainty makes the cost of disclosure relatively low.
Conversely, if proﬁts are relatively high, nondisclosure imposes only little risk on the investor
so that no investments in the outside option are made. Since in that case the ﬁrm’s expected
investment under nondisclosure is relatively high, the beneﬁt of disclosure is relatively low.
Furthermore, since zero investment in the outside option implies that nondisclosure imposes
no risk on the ﬁrm, the cost of disclosure is relatively high.
In the model, one may think of the investor as representing a capital market and the
ﬁrms as representing a speciﬁc industry. In this context, one can interpret
v as an indicator
18of the industry’s risk. A low value of
v implies that an industry has high risk as investing in
a nondisclosing ﬁrm can result in opportunity losses if the disclosing ﬁrm turns out to be a
low type. A high value of
v, on the other hand, implies that an industry has low risk as even
the low type ﬁrms in the industry yield higher returns than the outside option. Applying the
partial disclosure equilibrium results of Proposition 3 then implies, that one should observe
more disclosures in a high risk industry than in a low risk industry. Firms in a high risk
industry know that they have to disclose additional information so as to convince investors
of their quality. If they do not disclose, investors will put their capital in other investment
opportunities. In particular, this may induce disclosure by ﬁrms that expect to be of a low
type, i.e. bad news disclosures may occur. Firms in a low risk industry, on the other hand,
know that investors will invest in their industry independent of their disclosure decision. Since
they are not willing to risk a negative response by investors, they do not disclose their private
information. In particular, ﬁrms that expect to be a high type may not disclose, i.e. good news
is concealed.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the equilibriumdisclosure strategyof ﬁrms that face uncertainty regarding
the market’s response to a voluntary disclosure of their private information. It is shown that
this uncertainty provides an incentive for the ﬁrm to withhold its private information as the
ﬁrm does not want to risk an unfavorable response by the market. Under certain conditions,
this uncertainty can give rise to a full nondisclosure equilibrium.
In a partial disclosure equilibrium, ﬁrms use voluntary disclosures to redistribute the
risk between the investor and the ﬁrms. In this respect, the paper differs form the existing
literature, where ﬁrms generally use voluntary disclosures to separate themselves from less
proﬁtable ﬁrms. In a partial disclosure equilibrium, ﬁrms disclose relatively low returns be-
cause if returns are low, nondisclosure imposes too much risk on the investor, which adversely
affects the investments in the ﬁrms. If returns are relatively high, the risk that nondisclosure
imposes on the investor is small and does not signiﬁcantly affect the investments in the ﬁrms.
Hence, disclosure does not occur as ﬁrms are not willing to take the risk of an unfavorable
response by the investor.
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Hence, (12) is weakly greater than (13) so that for each
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￿ . Applying the














































































































































) , it follows that the expected utility from nondisclosure in (23) is

































































































) no longer exists. Second,






















































2. The reason that this condition differs






















































































































































































￿in expressions (16) and (18),





















































































































































































































































































































































































) . Hence, disclosure is strictly preferred to
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